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Introduction
Kant's Conception of Logic

Agents-specifically, human beings-think, and they do so in accordance with rules. Saul Kripke's provocative interpretation of Wittgenstein has inspired a rather large literature around the very question
of what it would even mean to follow a rule. Yet well before considering that well-known, and vexing, difficulty, it is of some use to determine the precise (if only purported) function of a given rule, as well as
its modal "status," in order to see if any application of that rule can be
justified: in Kant's language, to establish the scope and limits of a rule
and, in turn, a set of rules. For Kant, such a set of rules, ranging over a
specified domain, can indeed be identified, articulated, and justifiedif only through a demanding process of philosophical reflection. That
set of rules, again relative to a specific domain, qualifies as a logiC. It is
along these lines that Kant presents his conception of general, or universal (allgemeine) logic.
Agents also judge, and if Kant is right, they do so in accordance
with rules. Here, the specified domain-possible experience-introduces an element foreign to general logic, but the fundamental inSight remains the same. One can identify, articulate, and justify (again
through philosophical reflection) a set of rules relative to the domain.
For Kant, the justified application of those rules within the legitimate
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Kant's Conception ofLogic
Table 1. Structure of the Critique of Pure Reason
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements

(pp.17- 70 4)

A.

Transcendental Aesthetic

(PP· 19-49)

B.

Transcendental Logic

(PP·5 0 - 70 4)

B.1.

Transcendental Analytic

(pp. 64- 292)

B.2.

Transcendental Dialectic

(PP·293- 70 4)

II.

Transcendental Doctrine of Method

(PP·7 0 5- 856 )

I.

Note: Page numbers refer to the first ("Pl.') edition of 1781.

domain of possible experience constitutes Transcendental Analyticj their illegitimate application constitutes Transcendental Dialectic.
Taken together, Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic constitute Transcendental Logic.
By looking at the structure of the Critique of Pure Reason, one immediately sees that the vast majority of the text is devoted to Transcendental Logic. If one excludes the introductory material and the important, but relatively neglected, Transcendental Doctrine of Method, the
remaining text consists of the radically disproportionate halves of the
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements (see table 1).
Clearly enough, Kant seeks to exploit the analogy between such a
conception oflogic, qua "a logiC of possible experience;' and the more
traditional conception of formal or general logic, which he calls "universal" or "general" (allgemeine) logic, although, as we will eventually
see, identifying general logic with traditional or contemporary conceptions of formal or symbolic logic is problematic. Logic, in its analytic
moment, establishes and justifies these rulesj the illegitimate application of these rules gives rise to dialectic. The complex modal structure
of Kant's strategy should also be noted here. When general logic is said
to provide a set of rules that range necessarily over a specified domain,
that domain is to be regarded as possible thoughtj similarly, the domain for transcendental analytic is possible experience. Consequently,
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transcendental analytic would constitute a set of universal and necessary rules for the possibility of experiencej as the point has been usefully characterized, Kant is interested in showing the "necessity of a
possibility:'l If Kant is correct, then, just as we can determine (reflectively) what rules are necessary for the possibility of thought, we can reflect on experience to determine that a certain set of conditions (rules,
presuppositions) must be satisfied for that experience to be possible.
The following discussion seeks to explore and, it is hoped, illuminate the analogy Kant draws between general and transcendental logic. It will be argued that this analogy, which both structures the Critique of Pure Reason and drives many of its arguments, yields a position
that is immoderate, yet modest. UndoubtedlYi the philosophical view
in question is immoderate, in that Kant characterizes the concepts
and principles it delineates as, among other things, irrevisable, incorrigible, indubitable, necessary, universal, infallible, and certain. At the
same time, its results are modest, in that what Kant attempts to articulate in the Critique merely establishes the scope and limits of the application of rules, relative to a given domain, leaving, for example, speCific epistemic claims to be examined in light of the "fruitful bathos of
experience."2 In this waYi I hope to provide an interpretation of Kant's
Critical philosophy that not only demonstrates his strategy to put legitimate metaphysical inquiry on a firm basis, but also reveals why
many of the original hopes of philosophy-the aims of applying pure
reason, without critical reflection-"we may have to give up as futile"
(Bvii). These results, I believe, will also reinforce the notion that, fundamentallYi Kant's views appeal to a conception of "common-sense"
that Was popular in his day and that continues to endure, a result that

.
1. H . ]. de VIeeschauwer, La deduction transcendentale dans l'oeuvre de Kant (ParIS: Leroux, ).934-37), pOli K. Reich, "Die Vollstandigkeit del' kantischen Urteilstafel"
(Dissertation, Rostock, ).932), 27. A key passage for understanding Kant's strategy is his
distinction between "principle" and "theorem" at A737=B76Si an especially helpful exegeSIs of this passage is given in A. Genova, "Kant's Notion of Transcendental PresuppoSItion in the First Critique," in Essays on Kant's C ritique of Pure Reason, cd.]. Mohanty
and R . Shahan (Norman: University of Okla homa Press, 1982), 99- J.26.
2 . Prolegomena, Ak. rv; 373 n.i judgments of pure mathematics raise technical issues that I ignore here.
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may appear at first glance curious for a philosopher with the reputation for forbidding difficulty that Kant has. 3
I begin with what I call, for lack of better terms, Kant's "critical" or
"dialectical" conception of the thinking and judging subject. Here we
examine what is perhaps the central difficulty of the Critique of Pure
Reason, namely, how subjective conditions can claim objective validity, or, to phrase the point differently, why conditions imposed by a subject must at the same time be regarded as universal and necessary. The
task here is complicated by the ambiguity with which Kant employs
the terms "subjective" and "objective;' as well as their derivatives; further difficulties result from the fact that this issue, as much as any, compelled Kant to rewrite important parts of the Critique, which include
some of the most impenetrable pages of that text. We see him, understandably, struggle with his characterization of the subject, and its role,
in his published and unpublished writings between the two editions
of the Critique; he continues to do so in those works (again, both published and unpublished) that occur after the Critique's second edition.
Here, I will attempt to keep the account to a manageable scope by focusing on the relationship between the thinking subject and logic as
given in the Critique itself, draWing on other texts only when necessary
to clarify Kant's central claims relative to this relationship. The central
claim to be argued here is that if a coherent model of the thinking and
judging subject emerges from Kant's text (particularly from the Transcendental Deduction and Paralogisms of Pure Reason), then his conception of how this subject can, on reflection, identify a set of rules-a
logic-relative to a given domain is largely defensible, as is Kant's insistence on the universality and necessity of those sets of rules for any
relevantly similar agent. Indeed, Kant's account oflogic-both general and transcendental-makes sense only for the kind of thinking and
judging subject he considers. If successful, this would deflect the sting
of one longstanding complaint against the Critical philosophy, its alleged extreme subjectivism.
Kant's analogy between general and transcendental logic provides
3. For historical details on Kant's relationship to the tradition of "common sense"
philosophy, see Manfred Kuehn's Scottish CommOll Sense in Germany, 1768- 1800 (Kings-
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the central thread tying together the arguments of the First Critique;
the premises, arguments, and conclusions Kant offers, I believe, must
be seen in light of this analogy. If that is the case, then what Kant himself means by "logic" must be clarified. 1his is not a particularly easy
task, in that Kant himself uses the term in contexts where it is not entirely clear whether in employing the term "logic" he means general
logic, transcendental logic, or some still more vague conception that
includes both. TIle project is made still more complicated by the historical consensus that Kant's conception of general, or formal, logic is coextensive with Aristotelian syllogistic; as C. S. Peirce sums up
this consensus, "we are to remember that, according to Kant, nothing
worth mention had been contributed to logic since Aristotle," a view
that one can find as easily in Hegel as in contemporary, and competent, histories of logic and philosophy.4 To clarify Kant's own conception oflogic, so fundamental to the analogy we shall examine, I look at
the manner in which Kant employs the notion of "logiC," arguing that
for Kant, general logic should not be interpreted along the lines of a
contemporary formal model. For Kant, "logic" is employed to identify
a set of conditions for thought in general-hence tlle term "allgemeine
logic," used to indicate its universality-in a manner similar to Wittgenstein's usage in his Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus.
I also look at Kant's notion of a "conceptual scheme"- a notion
that I will return to, in discussing some of Donald Davidson's workWithin the context of his view of natural language. Kant has consistently been taken to task, by critics of his day and our own, for having
ignored the problem of natural language. The earliest, and still bestknown, objection is that of]. G. Hamann, who argued that in attempting to "purify" reason, Kant neglected the most significant aspect of
language, its contingent nature, a point that has been further developed by contemporary scholars. I will argue that, on the contrary,
ton [Ont.]: McGill-Qyeen's UniverSity Press, 1987). Karl Ameriks has emphasized
Kant's "broad and often un appreciated concern with conunon sense" in his recent Kant
and the Fate of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
4. C. S. Peirce, Elements of Logic §39, in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, voL 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1931).

xviii

Kant's Conception ofLogic

Kant is concerned with language, albeit at a logical or grammatical
level, in his attempt to identify conditions necessary for judgments to
take place in any language. Therefore, Hamann and his contemporary
followers fail to recognize the relevance of Kant's approach for providing conditions of rational agency, or his contribution to the history of
the search for a universal grammar. (I will sketch as well an abbreviated outline of the tradition of universal grammar that sheds a good
bit oflight on Kant's own account.) Hamann's mistake, I believe, continues to be registered by many contemporary philosophers who marvel at "Kant's well-known indifference to language:'s This discussion
will then reinforce an earlier result of this study, namely, that on Kant's
conception oflogic, we reflectively discover a set of rules that are universally and necessarily binding on thought and cognition, although
here in a specific linguistic context. 6
I further provide some of the historical background and context
of informing Kant's views, which will include both Stoic and Scholastic contributions to this history, including a brieflook at the influential
texts of the Port-Royal school, the Significance of which must take into
consideration not only the Port-Royal "logic" (La Logique, ou l'Art de
Penser) but also the Port-Royal "grammar" (Grammaire generale et raisonnee). In the attempt to weave together these various influences on
Kant's thought, we will discover that the almost canonical identification of Kant's logic with that of Aristotle is at best historically naive,
and has served as a serious obstacle to understanding the First Critique.
With a coherent conception of the relationship between the subject and a given set of rules, and a clearer philosophical and historical
understanding of what Kant means by "logic;' we take up one of the
most controversial and debated aspects of Kant's project in the Critique, the justification of those rules, specifically the Analytic moment
of Transcendental Logic. Here I will begin to explore the exegetical
5. H. Aarsleff, Fmm Locke to Sauss[,re (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1982), 11.
6. In this context, it is worth noting Beatrice Longuenesse's remark that for Kant,
"no judgment (as psychological activity) can take place without li nguistic expression"
Kant and the Capacity to Judge, trans. C. Wolfe (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1998), 1Oon47; cf. "Jische" LogicAk. IX, 604- 5.
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details of Kant's arguments by examining the influence of Rousseau's
thought on Kant, specifically in addressing the question of autonomy
Writ large. While there is now a century-long tradition recognizing the
importance of Rousseau for Kant, I will argue, albeit briefly here, that
this influence has been misconstrued within that tradition by focusing
almost exclusively on Kant's practical (moral) philosophy. Instead, I
will try to demonstrate that Rousseau's importance for Kant is at least
as significant in the strategy Rousseau employs, a strategy grounded
in the notion of self-legislation. While there are a number of historical
antecedents in the development of this notion, I will argue that Rousseau's contribution plays the crucial role in how Kant goes about structuring his Own arguments for justifying the rules oflogic. I then turn to
the text that is central to the relationship between General Logic and
Transcendental LogiC, the "MetaphYSical Deduction:' The difficulties
here are manifold: Kant scholars have long argued about what, if anything, is established by this "deduction" and about whether it qualifies,
even on Kant's language, as a "deduction"j even were we to grant that it
does so qualify, it is not entirely clear how it differs from the much better-known Transcendental Deduction. Making things still worse, Kant
Uses the term "metaphysical deduction" only once, in the second edition of the Critique (at B159), although the argument to which the term
purports to refer is in both editionsj not surprisingly, where the argument even is has been the matter of some debate.
A now-traditional reading of the metaphYSical deduction, as given by Schopenhauer and Jonathan Bennett, among many others, sees
Kant as beginning with a set of judgment-forms, from which he then
develops ("hacks and wrenches," in Bennett's colorful terminology? a
corresponding set of categories with that earlier table in mind. He can
then claim to have derived the table of categories from the table of judgments, both of which he views as complete, universal, necessary, and
so on. On this interpretation, the metaphYSical deduction becomes an
indefenSible and arbitrary construct, owing too much at once to both
7· Kant's "favoured dozen" judgment-forms "serve throughout the Critique only
as a Procrustean bed on which he hacks and wrenches his philosophical inSights into
a grotesque 'system,'" Kant's AnalytiC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966),
89. The image is originally Schopenhauer's.
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the Aristotelian tradition and Kant's own unwavering loyalty to his architectonic, a view that has been vigorously challenged by Klaus Reich,
Reinhardt Brandt, and others. Here I also challenge this reading, from
a somewhat different direction, by looking at the table of judgments
in light of the history of logic earlier sketched, by calling into question
the very notion that Kant "derives" the table of categories from the table of judgments, and by offering an alternate interpretation of Kant's
notorious claim that the two tables are "complete:'
I then turn to some issues where Kant's Critical philosophy engages topics of contemporary interest. I first take up Laurence BonJour's recent work, where he argues that without some kind of commitment to the a priori-which Bonjour develops into a program he
calls "moderate rationalism"-we risk "giving up rational thought altogether." I argue that on the basis of Bonjour's reading, he in fact fails to
recognize Kant as prOViding the strongest arguments available for the
a priori, and that Kant's results, which combine a correspondence theory of truth and a coherentist theory of knowledge and experience, are
strikingly similar to Bonjour's own results. Yet BonJour, I think, fails to
see that the strategy he adopts, which appeals, at best, to strong inductive arguments, is not Sufficient to provide the conclusions he needs.
I then return to an earlier pOint, to consider whether Kant's conception of logic can be seen as a conceptual framework, imposed by
a thinking and judging subject, that yields a set of rules providing
minimal, albeit universal and necessary, constraints for the possibility of meaningful thought and for possible experience. Employing the
very notion of a "conceptual scheme" is, of course, itself fraught with
controversy; here I simply hope to show that a Kantian "conceptual
scheme" or "framework," as construed here, both is unavoidable and
does not succumb to the standard kinds of objections in contemporary analytic philosophy, particularly those raised by Donald Davidson. As Davidson remarks about his own work, "Kant's influence has
been the most pervasive, but it runs so deep that I have seldom acknowledged it in print."8 Davidson has argued, famously, that the no8. Donald DaVidson, "Intellectual Autobiography," in The Philosophy ojDoJlald DaVidson, ed. L. E. Hahn (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1999),64.
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tion of alternate conceptual schemes is incoherent in its reliance on an
ill-posed contrast between organizing scheme and a "given" content to
be organized; consequently, the "very idea" of a conceptual scheme is
itself untenable.9 Davidson argues: "We have found no intelligible basis on which can be said that schemes are different. It would be equally
wrong to announce the glorious news that all mankind-all speakers
oflanguage, at least-share a common scheme and ontology. For if we
cannot intelligibly say that schemes are different, neither can we intelligibly say that they are one."l0

It is not entirely clear that this is a result Kant would reject; indeed,
on one reading, it is one he not only would embrace, but in fact argued
for in his own work. At the same time Kant would add that certain notions, or prinCiples, or rules-no doubt including those originally articulated in the table of judgments-would have to be presupposed
even to get the kind of background agreement Davidson relies on to
get his argument off the ground, although they would be discoverable
only reflectively. Such a set of rules, of course, Kant characterizes as a
"logic." TIle point is that an agent who rejects all principles-that is,
who fails to adopt any principle that could be characterized as such
a principle of logic-could not qualify, on Kant's view, as rational.
The principles at issue here, then, serve as candidates for being necessary-and not sufficient-conditions of rationality. The question that
arises is this: in attributing agency to another, must we attribute some
set of minin1allogical constraints on meaning and communicability,
and, if so, can they be satisfactorily identified? Furthermore, it is worth
emphasizing that this claim functions as a normative constraint on reason; frequently agents are, in fact, inconsistent; frequently we commit
the Simplest mistakes in reasoning and unknowingly embrace contradictory or inconsistent beliefs. But when made cognizant of such mis9· The locus classicus of the view is D. Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual
Scheme," reprinted in Inquiries illto Truth a/ld Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
19 84 ), 183- 98. Interestingly enough, Davidson elsewhere notes that, among others, Kant

pursued his metaphYSical inquiries by studying "the general stru cture of/anguage"; "The
~ethod ofTruth in Metaphysics" in the same coll ection (199); my emphasis. See also DaVIdson, "Th e Second Person/' in Midwest Studies;"/ Philosophy, ed. P. French, T. Uehl ing,
and H . Wettstein, vol. 17 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 255-67.
10. DaVidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme/, 198.
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takes, we have an intellectual obligation to eliminate the inconsistency.
Whether we choose to call this set of rules a "conceptual scheme" or
not makes relatively little difference in this context, in that Kant is not
contrasting such a logic or scheme with a given content, as are those
Davidson criticizes. For Kant, the status of these rules, as universal and
necessary, or a priori, is unambiguous; here I will attempt to explicate
how one might view such principles within the context of Davidson's
own work, in short, what a Davidsonian account of a prioricity-if
such a thing is not itself contradictory-would amount to. To be sure,
Davidson's unwillingness to countenance the analytic-synthetic distinction, and any of the strong a prioricity required by Kant's approach,
prevents Davidson from presenting a genuinely Kantian picture. At the
same time, there seems to be no in-principle conflict between Davidson's identification of language-users with belief-holding agents and
Kant's insistence that some minimal set oflogical-in the sense of both
general and transcendental logic-conditions is isolable and justifiable
in that identification. In short, for Kant there is some core of beliefs that
we must attribute to another ifwe are to recognize that other as an agent
under any sufficiently complex description. I argue here that there may
be reasons for seeing that Davidson ultimately cannot avoid introducing some such element into his program, particularly in light of his later
work, where he develops a "triangulation" strategy in characterizing the
relationship among two agents and a shared stimulus. l l
I then look, all too briefly, at those philosophers who have influentially argued that most, if not all, of the traditional commitments of
the Enlightenment-necessity, truth, and objectivity among themneed to be eliminated as philosophical goals, and we must rather remain content with the thoroughgoing "postmodern" embrace of ge11. An anonymous reader of an earlier version of this material put it well: what is
needed here is a way "to tease apart the Kantian and the Qj:>inean elements in Davidson's work," in terms of radical interpretation, agency, and rationality. There seem to
be, and certaillly are on Kant's view, in-principle limits in characterizing these notions.
From that perspective, it becomes difficult to countenance Quine's well-known claim
that "no statement is immune to revision," and it is more than simple "logic-chopping"
to ask how one might in fact revise this statement itself. See "Two Dogmas ofEmpiricism;' in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

1980),43.
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nealogy, convention, and ideology. Looking specifically at a fragment
of the work of Michel Foucault, I argue that the reading Foucault and
others have proposed fails to conceptualize Kant's results in the logical
way Kant presents them, and thus the postmodern critique of Kant either attributes to Kant positions he in fact rejects or is forced to adopt
the logical thrust of his transcendental strategy to avoid a crippling relativism or skepticism.
I conclude this study by tying together its various elements-historical, exegetical, and contemporary- in a relatively brief summary,
arguing that Kant's results, while immoderate in the sense that they
propose universal and necessary constraints on nitionality, must also
be seen, in terms of what these arguments establish, as modest. We
can regard, in spite of Davidson's important and suggestive objections,
Kant's logic-the legitimate rules of general logic and transcendental
analytic-as a conceptual scheme, imposing a set of unyielding, invariant synthetic concepts and principles employed a priori. But these
concepts and principles must be regarded as providing the conditions
of possible thought and experience and as fixing the limits within
which they occur.12 TIle structure Kant argues for in the Transcendental Analytic, and the exposure in the Transcendental Dialectic of the
errors of attempting to transcend the limits imposed by that structure
(along with those of the Aesthetic), is for many difficult enough to accept. Any "defense" of Kant's project becomes hopeless if his conceptual scheme is taken as establishing anything more than formal conditions for the possibility of thought and experience, or worse, if formal
conditions are taken as establishing substantial, material conclusions
about the content of that experience. Thus, I think we must regard that
conceptual scheme as immodest yet minimal-immodest in establishing absolutely universal and strictly necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, yet as such imposing only a minin1al framework
Within which questions of science, mathematics, and empirical experience are investigated. As Arthur Melnick has succinctly stated, "at least
part of Kant's empirical realism is that everything is 'left open' that

Zen.

12.

See Prolegomena, Ale N.35 2 , where Kant distinguishes Schranken from Grel/-
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could be left open," where "left open" is construed as "undecideable on
a priori grounds or not in any way contributed by the subject."l3 As
I hope to have shown, the interpretation of Kant's project along the
lines given in what follows makes that project considerably more attractive, and of considerable more relevance, than its current reception
in contemporary philosophy would indicate.
13· Arthur Melnick, Kant's Analogies ofExperience (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1973) 156.

